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SHAME'S REVIVAL:
AN UNCONSTITUIONAL REGRESSION
Mark Spat
The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.
-ChiefJusice Earl Warren, Trop v. Dulles
INTRODUTIION
In September of 2000, in an Arkansas court, a mother pled guilty
to a traffic violation for not having her three-year-old daughter
strapped into a car-safety seat.2 Unsatisfied with the usual fine, the
judge ordered the mother to write a mock obituary for her mentally
and physically disabled child.3
In 1997, a woman was convicted of drug possession. The judge
ordered her to stand on a public street corner wearing a sign saying,
"I got caught possessing cocaine. Ordered by Judge Whitfield."4
In Houston, a man convicted of domestic violence in 1997 after
hitting his estranged wife was forced to apologize from the steps of
City Hall.-
In Florida, a woman was required to place an advertisement in her
local paper confessing that she had bought drugs in front of her chil-
dren.
In 1991, Darlene Johnson, "a pregnant mother of four, was con-
victed of beating two of her daughters with a belt and an electrical
cord."7 To avoid prison, Ms. Johnson acquiesced to the judge's con-
J.D. Candidate, 2002, University of Pennsylvania Law School; AB., 1999, Brown University.
2 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957) (majority opinion).
See Michelle Bradford, Mom Appeals Order To Pen Girl's Obituary. Judge Gives Sentence for
Safety-SeaI Violation, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETIE, Sept. 15,2000, at Al.
3Id.
4 Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 734 (1998)
(citing "Eye on America," CBS Morning News (CBS television broadcast, May 16, 1997)).5 
..Jeffrey Abramson, Editorial Are Courts Getting Too Creative?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1999, at
A31.
6 Id.
7 Judy Farah, Rule of Law: Crime and Creative Punishmen WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1995, at A15.
See also Broadman v. Comm'n on judicial Performance (Cal. 1998) (reviewing ajudge's discre-
tion in ordering the implant of a contraceptive as a condition of probation).
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dition of probation that she be implanted with a contraceptive.8
Increasingly, judges are punishing criminals in a new and seem-
ingly effective way-through the imposition of shame and other
forms of emotionally distressing sanctions. Having grown weary of
"one-size-fits-all" punishments, many judges are giving "voice to a
community's fury and moral disgust." For example, Judge Howard
Broadman, who ordered that the abusive mother be implanted with a
contraceptive, stated, "The current system is broken, no question. Is
it right for a judge to sit back and do the same sentencing? I think
not. That's the definition of insanity."10 These punishments go be-
yond the simple legislative guidelines for convicted criminals; rather,
more so than a fine or community service, they express a moral con-
demnation of the offender's conduct." In fact, these sanctions are
examples of a moral reform theory of punishment, which forces theS 12
wrongdoer to take time to reflect upon his indiscretion. It is not
much different from a parent or teacher having a child write an essay
about what he did wrong or stand in the corner for the duration of
the class. Through the use of shame, these punishments serve re-
tributivist,13 deterrent,14 and rehabilitative ends; 5 it is a virtual pana-
cea for criminal conduct.1
6
At first glance, shame may seem a novel and ideal form of pun-
ishment, but it is not without its faults. Shaming punishments strip
8 Farah, supra note 7, atAl5.
9 Abramson, supra note 5, atA31.
10 Farah, supra note 7, atAl5.
n1 See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 635 (1996)
("[S]haming penalties ... do something that conventional alternative sanctions don't do: ex-
press appropriate moral condemnation.").
12 See Garvey, supra note 4, at 738-39 (" [T] his appealing but largely neglected theory... rec-
ommends the infliction of hardship on an offender that 'mirrors' his own wrongdoing in order
to morally 'educate' him, to make him see the error of his ways, and ideally, to lead him to re-
pentance.").
13 Retributivists believe that an offender should be punished simply because he deserves to
be sanctioned. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILIY,
CHARACIER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 181 (Ferdinand
Schoeman ed., 1987).
14 Deterrence theories of punishment hold that a state punishes in order to prevent future
crimes. The idea is that people will follow the law, rather than break it and risk punishment.
The threat of punishment deters the criminal act. See, e.g., Gordon Hawkins, Punishment and
Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizin& and Habituative Effects, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 550, 555.
("[P]unishment is a ritualistic device designed to influence persons by intimating symbolically
social disapproval and society's moral condemnation.")
15 See Garvey, supra note 4, at 754 ( "[T]he possibility that shame can rehabilitate has been
noted as a source of its appeal.").
16 See id. at 746-57 (discussing how shaming punishments fit into each theory of punish-
ment). While retributivism, deterrence, and rehabilitation are not the only theories of punish-
ment, they are the most widely studied and influential. See generally SANFORD H. KADISH &
STEPHENJ. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIAIS, 102-25 (6th
ed. 1995).
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the convicted of more than their liberty; they rob them of their dig-. ° •17
nity, which no morally decent society should do. The attorney for
the now sterilized Ms. Johnson' clearly reiterated this point:
We all know the kind of bad things that people do that get arrested. The
court is really witness to one long continuum of man's inhumanity to
man. But does that mean that our courts and our governments and our
policies are to stoop to the same level of inhumanity as the worst of its
citizens--the worst of its citizens who end up being defendants in crimi-
nal cases? 9
As effective as shaming punishments may seem in satisfying the pub-
lic call for new and more constructive means of sanctioning criminal
behavior, these punishments may exceed the simple rubric of judicial
innovation. Shaming could serve an effective purpose in any penal
system-it provides retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation in a
neat package'---but the penalties do so at the cost of the convicted's
dignity, which may be too high a price under the United States Con-
21stitution.
The Eihth Amendment specifically bans "cruel and unusual pun-
ishment." While the Amendment's scope has often been limited to
cases involving proportionality of punishment,2 a more liberal inter-
pretation of the Amendment and its place in the American penal sys-
tem supports a broader application. Since the dawn of constitutional
interpretation, the meaning of the Constitution and its provisions
have never stagnated to reflect only the time at which a provision was
adopted. Rather, the breadth and freedoms that the Constitution
embraces is ever evolving, and thus:
The Eighth Amendment's ban on inflicting cruel and unusual punish-
ments. . ."[proscribes] more than physically barbarous punishments." It
prohibits penalties that are grossly disproportionate to the offense, as
17 See AVISHAI MARGALrT, THE DECENT SOCIEWY 262 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996) ("[A]
society is a decent one if it punishes its criminals-even the worst of them-without humiliating
them.").
is SeeFarah, supranote 7, atA15.
19 Id. (quoting Charles Rothbaum).
2D See Garvey, supra note 4, at 746-57.
21 See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880,
1937 (1991) ("[T]he elusiveness of shame, the unreflective way in which the new shaming sanc-
tions have been developed, and the serious harm to human dignity that truly effective shaming
can cause, all suggest that the fairness objections to official shunning and shame are particularly
compelling.").
2U.S. CON. amend. VIII.
See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (finding that a life sentence without possibil-
ity of parole for check fraud was a disproportionate punishment for the crime committed and
was therefore unconstitutional); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (finding a fifteen
year prison sentence for false entries in a public document to be excessive).
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well as those that transgress today's "broad and idealistic concepts of dig-
nity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency."
2 4
In that shaming punishments are degrading, and often inhumane,2
they should not survive in the face of the decency and integrity that
the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment de-
mands.
This Comment analyzes shame punishments in light of current
Eighth Amendment constitutional jurisprudence. Part I traces the
history of punishment in the United States, specifically noting a trend
in civilizing the treatment of criminals. By reviewing the influence of
Blackstone, the Framers, and the Supreme Court, Part II seeks to de-
termine the meaning of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment. Finally, Part III reviews the potential unconsti-
tutionality of shame punishments, finding that such punishments are
unacceptable under the Eighth Amendment's progressive dictates.
I. THE CHANGING FACE OF PUNISHMENT
As society has moved from primitive tribal cultures to the estab-
lishment of civilized nation-states, the methodology of punishment
has become increasingly humane and, to the greatest extent possible,
dignified.26 Torture and mutilation, once a pillar of an effective pe-
nal system, have given way to the modem day prison and probation
system. The evolution of punishment demands a growing civility in
the way society deals with its criminals. The reintroduction of shame
is antithetical to this evolution, as it turns the penal system back to a
time when notions of civility and dignity were not accounted for in
the sentencing of criminals.
24 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (citations omitted) (holding that confinement
in a prison or in an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth
Amendment standards and placing a maximum limit of thirty days on confinement in punitive
isolation).
See generally Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3
PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L. 645, 703 (1997) ("[Psychological works on shame ... analyze
closely... how shaming may convey contempt, and result in humiliation rather than shame.");
Massaro, supra note 21, at 1936 ("The humaneness of a penalty depends on a host of factors,
including whether it is proportional to the crime, is administered in an even-handed manner
across offenders, and is not exceptionally degrading or cruel.").
See generally HARRY ELMER BARNES, THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT.- A RECORD OF MAN'S
INHUMANrIYTO MAN 38-55 (1930) (discussing the evolution of punishment).
See generally ULLA V. BONDESON, ALTERNATIVES TO IMPRISONMIEr: INTENTIONS AND
REALITY 16-26 (1994) (discussing the development of modern day probation).
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A. Punishment at Its Earliest and Most Shameful
An examination of the earliest forms of punishment show that
humiliation and shame were critical elements of primitive penal sys-
tems.2 All forms of "hanging, drawing, and quartering were carried
out publicly in ceremonial fashion."' ' Thus, public humiliation fur-
ther contributed to the punishment itself; "a horrifying example was
not, though, the only purpose behind [such rituals] .... It was also
intended that the victim should be humiliated, for degradation fig-
ured largely in all contemporary theories of punishment."'
Perhaps the most telling sign of the importance of humiliation in
early penal systems was the use of branding as a means of punishing
common criminals.3' The Romans, French, and English all engaged•32
in this most effective method of shaming punishment. Branding in-
volved the burning of the first letter of the crime committed onto the
perpetrator's face. For example, murderers were branded with an
"M," vagrants with a V," and fighters with an "F."3' Branding was not
restricted to the Europeans; it was also an important feature of
American colonial jurisprudence.5 New Jersey, for example, pun-
ished burglars by branding first their hands and then their faces for
subsequent offenses. 6 The use of branding had repercussions be-
yond humiliation; such markings would preclude the branded from
finding employment, thus "render[ing] them desperate."37
The use of the pillorys was also a common method of punishment
whose operation was primarily psychological. 39 The pillory was largely
used to "bring about the feeling of humiliation naturally attendant
BARNES, supra note 26, at 43 ("With the coward the punishment was usually a matter of
gross humiliation or corporal punishment... [h]e might be deprived of his weapons, made to
eat with dogs, or to run a gauntlet of a shower of spears or clubs.").
Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modern Probation
Conditions, 1989 DUKE LJ. 1357, 1360-61 (1989).
Id. at 1361 (quoting CHRISTOPHERHIBBERT, THE ROOTS OFEVIL 27 (1963)).
31 BARNES, supra note 26, at 62.
32 Id.
33 Id.
!" Id.
3 Branding and other forms of corporal punishment were a feature of early colonial society.
Reform in the penal system and an abatement of these type of punishments began in the late
1700s. See Daniel E. Hall, When Caning Meets the Eighth Amendment: Whipping Offenders in the
United States, 4 WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 403,416-19 (1995).
BARNES, supra note 26, at 62 ("[Tihe first offense was to be punished by branding with a T
on his hand, while the second offense was to be punished by branding an R on his forehead.").
GEORGEIVES, A HISTORYOFPENALMETHODS53 (1914).
33 A pillory is a "device for publicly punishing offenders consisting of a frame and adjustable
boards erected on a post and having holes through which the head and hands of the offender
were thrust." WEBSrER'S INIERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGUSH LANGUAGE 1716 (3d ed.
1993).
S9 BARNES, supra note 26, at 62-63.
JOURNAL OF CONSTTVTIONAL LAW
upon the infliction of public disgrace. "4° Further humiliating those
confined to the pillory was the public's practice of construing the
criminal's public confinement as an opportunity to express their
condemnation by pelting him with "decayed vegetables, rotten eggs,
and even stones.
4 1
Such methods of punishment had effects transcending the pun-
ishment itself. A person punished in such a manner was often
shunned by the entire community; though "the spectacle was over,
those punished, although released from 4punishment, never would re-
turn to their previous place in society." The shame lasted well be-
yond the punishment, and the stigmatization of the criminal was as-
sured.
B. A Move Toward Civility-the Rise of Prisons
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, imprisonment in the
United States was rare. Prisons were generally reserved for political
and religious offenders, as well as debtors.4 It was not until the end
of the eighteenth century that a transition from the corporal forms of
punishment 4 to imprisonment began to take hold in penal theory.45
From 1820 to 1970, corporal punishment fell out of favor and almost
completely disappearedi4
The earliest reformers were the Quakers, 47 who believed that soli-
tude would afford the offenders time to reflect on their wrongs and
rehabilitate themselves.48 In addition, the Quakers believed that it
was necessary to treat the prisoners with a certain sense of kindness
while also giving them direction. 49 To effectuate this theory of con-
4 Id.
41 Id. at 63.
Brilliant, supra note 29, at 1361-62.
4 BARNES, supra note 26, at 114.
+4 Corporal punishments are those punishments applied to the body of an offender such as
capital punishment and whipping. WEBSrER'S INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE510 (3d ed. 1993).
BARNES, supra note 26, at 114 ("The eighteenth century was the period of transition from
corgoral punishment to imprisonment....").
John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian, 46 UCLA
L. REV. 1727, 1731 (1999).
4 See Sally Mann Romano, Comment, If the Shu Fits: Cruel and Unusual Punishment at Califor-
nia's Pelican Bay State Prison, 45 EMORY L.J. 1089, 1093 n.25 (1996) ("In 1787, a group of Quak-
ers from Philadelphia organized the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public
Prisons. The Society successfully urged the Pennsylvania General Assembly to pass legislation
transforming part of Philadelphia's Walnut StreetJail into a penitentiary, complete with solitary
confinement and hard labor.").
48 Rosalind K. Kelley, Note, Sentenced To Wear the Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovations in Sentenc-
ing-Are They Constitutional?, 93 DICK. L. REV. 759, 763 (1989).
49 Romano, supra note 47, at 1093-94.
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finement, reflection, and rehabilitation, the Quakers built separate
cells for the miscreant, where inmates could quietly and independ-
ently study the Bible.5° A prisoner was released when society regarded
him as "sufficiently reformed."51 For the Quakers, imprisonment en-
couraged rehabilitation. Such rehabilitative ends to confinement
would quickly find favor in Western nations, particularly in the
United States.
52
In the early twentieth centTuy, rehabilitation began to take a pre-
eminent role in penal theory. By 1935, the majority of states had
implemented an indeterminate sentencing structure, in which a
judge was given broad discretion to individualize prison sentences.'
Such tailored systems took into account all the circumstances sur-
rounding the crime, and thus the prisoner's sentence was designed to
serve the needs of rehabilitation as much as retribution.' In the
middle of the twentieth century, the parole and probation systems
were developed to "avoid the detrimental effects of imprisoning of-
fenders . . . ."6 The goal of probation is one of individual prevention.
More specifically, probation aims "to promote [a convict's] adjust-
ment to the community by using conditional sentence or probation
instead [of incarceration].'' 7 Probation is a "treatment ideology
which places greater importance on the resocialization of individuals
than general obedience to the law." s
The penal system that began its development in the late eight-
eenth century and that took hold in the twentieth century demon-
strated an increasing respect for the criminal's dignity despite the fact
that he was removed from society and imprisoned. The prison and
50 Kelley, supra note 48, at 763.
51 Id.
52 Two Pennsylvania prisons (the Western Penitentiary, built in 1829, and the Eastern Peni-
tentiary, built in 1836) were the first to implement the Quaker ideals, known at that time as the
"Pennsylvania System." Romano, supra note 47, at 1094. See also Braithwaite, supra note 46, at
1733 ("[T]he United States became the great laboratory of the penitentiary, attracting admirers
like de Tocqueville to visit on fact-finding tours of these new instruments of civilization.").
The nineteenth century witnessed a proliferation of the Quaker system. Confinement was
deemed an effective way of dealing with offenders. Therefore, as the Quaker system encour-
aged rehabilitation, by the dawn of the twentieth century, rehabilitation had become the pri-
mary goal of punishment. Kelley, supra note 48, at 763.
Id. at 763-64.
Id. at 764. For example, "a kidnapping in which a divorced parent takes a child from the
other parent's custody without permission is vastly different from a kidnapping in which a child
is snatched by a stranger for ransom money." Id. at 764 n.46.
56 BONDESON, supra note 27, at 187. Some critics of the prison system have noted that pris-
ons are not utopias of rehabilitation; rather, they are schools for crime. Prisoners are exposed
to all members of the criminal world and thus are taught new crimes while becoming increas-
ingly enmeshed in criminal subcultures. The violent and sometimes oppressive atmosphere of
prisons can leave an inmate more angry at the world than when they entered prison.
57 BONDESON, supra note 27, at 187.
5 Id.
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probationary system was a vast improvement over the barbaric public
tortures and branding that marked the earliest forms of punishment.
In progressive republics such as the United States, a respect and a be-
lief in criminal rehabilitation seemed to be in line with the burgeon-
ing tolerance and esteem for individuals of all genders, races, and
creeds.59 Assuming that a modem day republic such as the United
States aspires to decency, "[e]very human being, even a criminal, is
entitled to the respect granted to humans because they are human.
An injury to human dignity is humiliation, and so even a criminal is
entitled not to be humiliated." 6 The dignity of all members of soci-
ety, including those convicted of crimes, needs to be revered and pro-
tected. Thus, a penal system that includes imprisonment and proba-
tion with an eye toward rehabilitation represents a vastly improved
and progressive punishment methodology (when compared to the
draconian public tortures and shaming that persisted until the close
of the eighteenth century) and demonstrates a respect for criminals
as individuals.
II. DEFINING THE "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT" CLAUSE OF
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Given the steady movement towards a more dignified penal system
and the progressiveness of constitutional interpretation, the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment should be ex-
panded to include the shaming punishments described above.
Though imprisonment is not necessarily a bastion of humanity, it may
in fact be a more dignifying experience than having to wear a T-shirt
proclaiming, "I am a felon on probation for theft., 61 This Section
aims to show that the Eighth Amendment was designed to serve pro-
gressive ends, and so what at one point in time may be considered
decent and constitutional, may at another time be found cruel and
unconstitutional. By tracing the origins and evolution of the Eighth
Amendment, it becomes clear that the ban on cruel and unusual
punishment entails injecting an element of humanity in the sanction-
5 However, an argument can be made that prisons were inherently anti-republican: "At the
very moment in American history when republican freedom was acquiring its deepest meaning,
America took pride in institutions of unfreedom. It became permanently attached to the myth
that crime was a price of freedom, that freedom was so dangerous it had to be checked by re-
morseless unfreedom." Braithwaite, supra note 46, at 1733.
60 MARGALrT, supra note 17, at 262.
61 Id. at 262-70 (arguing that though imprisonment is not the ideal form of punishment, it
does mark a change in the moral sensitivity of society and so it stands as progress when com-
pared to the barbaric and humiliating punishments of the past). See also Part IIIA ("[I]f
prison means the deprivation of liberty, then it is not beyond comprehension that a 'person can
endure the deprivation of... liberty with dignity.' If this is the case, then it is possible to con-
clude that a short imprisonment may be better than shame ... .") (citations omitted).
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ing of law breakers, making it impossible to continue the draconian
penal practice of shame.
A. Blackstone's Influence
Perhaps no one had more of an influence on the American con-
stitutional structure than Sir William Blackstone. Prior to the draft-
ing of the United States Constitution, Blackstone's treatise, Commen-
taries on the Laws of England, served as the source of law for American
courts62 Furthermore, Blackstone was a prominent influence in the
debates over the Constitution: "[L]ike Montesquieu [, Blackstone]
was cited frequently by all sides. A trenchant reference to Blackstone
could quickly end an argument. ' Blackstone's influence crept into
the Framers' thoughts on nearly all aspects of the Constitution, in-
cluding the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment.
Though the punishment methods of the early eighteenth century
are somewhat foreign and barbaric in the eyes of modem society,
Blackstone's words served as a reminder that punishment did need to
be censored. In a day of public torture and shaming, Blackstone
wrote:
[T]he humanity of the English nation has authorized, by a tacit consent,
an almost general mitigation of such part of these judgments as savours
of torture or cruelty: a sledge or hurdle being usually allowed to such
traitors as are condemned to be drawn; and there being very few in-
stances... of any persons being embowelled or burned, till previously
deprived of sensation by strangling....
Embodied in Blackstone's text was a notion that punishment may not
be excessively cruel and respect must be given to the person who is
undergoing such extreme forms of official state sanction.
Blackstone also demanded that nations be governed by the rule of
law. As a result, he was advocating for a criminal code that provided
a general uniformity of punishment:
[I]t is moreover one of the glories of our English law, that the species,
though not always the quantity or degree of punishment, is ascertained for
every offence; and that it is not left in the breast of anyjudge, nor even of
See, e.g., David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial
Takings, 96 COLLJM L. REV. 1375, 1382 (1996) ("Blackstone's Commentaries were later adopted
by United States courts as the authoritative statement of English common law prior to the inde-
pendence of the American colonies and the drafting of the Constitution.").
H. Wayne House, A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There Be Peaceful Coexistence of Religion with
the Secular State?, 13 BYUJ. PUB. L. 203, 231 (1999) (quoting Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influ-
ence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL SCI. REV.
189, 190 (1984)).
6 See infra Part H.B.
5 4WIIAM BAcrONE, COMMENTARIES *376-77.
JOURNAL OF CONSTJTUTONAL LAW
a jury, to alter that judgment, which the law has beforehand ordained,
for every subject alike, without respect of persons.6
Without uniformity, men would be subject to the whims of judges,
creating a sense of arbitrary justice not acceptable in a republic:
"For, ifjudgments were to be the private opinions of the judge, men
would then be slaves to their magistrates; and would live in society,
without knowing exactly the conditions and obligations which it lays,,67
them under. The certainty and even-handedness of criminal penal-
ties allow an offender to fully understand the consequence of his ac-
tions, and nullifies arbitrary and unequal condemnation of one
criminal over another by a presiding judge.66
Blackstone's influence extended into the actual wording of the
Eighth Amendment: "For the bill of rights has particularly declared,
that excessive fines ought not to be imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.. . ."69 This very phrase was misread by the co-
lonial states and the Framers of the Constitution as a prohibition of
the tortures catalogued in the earlier portions of Blackstone's chap-
ter:
It seems to be generally accepted that such provisions [prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishments] in early Constitutions, particularly in those of
the original Thirteen States, were intended to prohibit the punishments
prohibited in England by 1 Win. And Mary, Ch. 2, the so-called Bill of
Rights of England .... These were the cruel and barbarous punishments
on occasion formerly imposed in England by the Crown. They were pun-
ishments considered at the time to be unnecessarily cruel and bordering
on outright torture such as breaking on the wheel, public dissection, and
the like. "
The Framers had misconstrued Blackstone, 7' but as such the misin-
terpretation became a foundation of American constitutional
thought, and so "such a reading explains the American framer's in-
terpretation of the cruel and unusual punishments clause; an inter-
66 Id. at *377.
67Id.
68 Id. at *378 ("[W]here an established penalty is annexed to crimes, the criminal may read
their certain consequence in that law, which ought to be the unvaried rule, as it is the inflexible
judge, of his actions."). See also Massaro, supra note 21, at 1940 ("To the extent that shame sanc-
tions are 'custom designed' to the offender, and not part of any sentencing guidelines, they
thus are subject to the abuse of unequal application.").
69 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENrARIES *378.
10 Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted" The Original Meaning,
57 CAL L. REV. 839, 865 (1969) (quoting State v. Cannon, 55 Del. 587, 591 (1963)).
71 Blackstone had not intended the prohibition of torturous punishment. Rather, he was
interested in proscribing excess and preserving individual respect. For example, a man could
be "embowelled or burned" so long as he were "previously deprived of sensation by strangling."
BLAcKSTONE, supra note 65, at *377.
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pretation which spawned the American doctrine that the words 'cruel
and unusual' proscribed not excessive but torturous punishments. "7
B. The Framers'Perceptions
Throughout the Constitutional Convention of 1789, many of the
Framers recognized a need to include enumerated liberties upon
which the newly created federal government could not infringe.73
Therefore, after the ratification of the revolutionary Federal Consti-
tution, the new Congress immediately began work on a set of
amendments guaranteeing liberties-the Bill of Rights-including
the ban on cruel and unusual punishment.74 It was during these de-
bates that the Framers revealed their liberal intentions behind the
adoption of the Eighth Amendment.
The Framers had a strong conception that a proper and civil pe-
nal system should not include the barbarities that marked many of
the punishments in other societies; such a prohibition was a necessary
element of the American experiment in republicanism.' During the
ratification debates of the Federal Constitution, Patrick Henry
warned his fellow Virginians of adopting a supreme government that
did not secure its civilians against oppressive punishment:
In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the
restriction of not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and
inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. These are prohibited by your
[Virginia] declaration of rights. What has distinguished our ancestors?
That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punish-
ments.
George Mason, author of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which
served as the model for the Bill of Rights, outlined the reach of the
Eighth Amendment "[One] clause of the bill of rights provided that
no cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted; therefore, tor-
ture was included in the prohibition. "77 The words of Mason and
Henry lend support to the idea that the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause of the Eighth Amendment was not an empty phrase.
'1 Granucci, supra note 70, at 865.
See generally THE NOTES ONTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1789 (Max Farrand ed., 1961).
74 COLONIES TO NATION, 1763-1789: A DOCUMENTARY HISTOrf OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 581 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1975) ("The first Congress under the new Constitution
met in March, 1789, and James Madison, one of the representatives from Virginia, quickly
moved to fulfill Federalist promises to add a bill of rights.").
See Granucci, supra note 70, at 839-42 (discussing the views of several important figures in
the drafting of the Eighth Amendment, including those of George Mason, the author of the
Virginia Declaration of Rights, the model for the federal Bill of Rights).
6 Id. at 841 n.10 (quoting 3J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES INTHE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THEADOPTION OFTHE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 447-48 (2d ed. 1881)).
Id. at 842.
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At the time of its adoption, the Eighth Amendment was consid-
ered an important safeguard against state infliction of inhumane
punishment. The goal was to limit the manner by which punishment
was to be inflicted. Examining the commentary surrounding the
drafting and ratification of the Eight Amendment reveals that "the
practices intended to be forbidden were punishments such as pillory-
ing, disemboweling, decapitation, and drawing and quartering; it was
unusual cruelty in the method of punishment that was condemned."',
The aim of the Framers was to eliminate torture9 as a tool of the po-
tentially oppressive hand of the newly created central government.
However, when examining Blackstone's influence and the words
of the Eighth Amendment's Framers, it becomes increasingly appar-
ent that the foundation upon which the prohibition of cruel and un-
usual punishment sits is in fact nothing less than decency.s° There-
fore, as society progresses and what was once considered decent
becomes an abomination in the eyes of many, the prohibitions cov-
ered by the Eighth Amendment should naturally be extended to in-
clude those modern conceptions of what is acceptable and, more im-
portantly, humane.
This was not the immediate impact of the Eighth Amendment.
Following the adoption of the Bill of Rights, "state and federal jurists
accepted the view that the clause prohibited certain methods of pun-
ishments. Since the 'barbarities' of Stuart England were not used of-
ten in America, the clause was rarely invoked in the courts."81 By the
end of the nineteenth century, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause had been so rarely invokedm that many considered it obsolete,
"aimed only at primitive practices that had long since passed away.",,
Furthermore, a new understanding of the clause had emerged-
"[t]he aim of the provision was said to be the prohibition of
78 Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 635, 637 (1966).
,9 "[lit is safe to affirm that punishments of torture ... are forbidden by [the eighth]
amendment to the Constitution." Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
8D Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, supra note 78, at 635 ("Fundamentally, the
provision rests upon considerations of human decency .... Not only is the offender's own hu-
man dignity at stake, but the standards of humanity embodied in any notion of society limit the
methods of punishment that society can conscionably impose.").
81 Granucci, supra note 70, at 842. The popular conception at the time was that the Framers
intended the Amendment to proscribe "not excessive but torturous punishments." Id. at 865.
It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that the Supreme Court first heard a
non-capital case dealing with the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. In O'Neil v. Vermont,
the question of whether imprisonment for the illegal distribution of liquor fell under those
punishments proscribed by the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment
was raised. The Court made no ruling, however, because it was not properly submitted as a fed-
eral question. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
83 Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, supra note 78, at 637.
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e aim of the provision was said to be the prohibition of 'unnecessary'
cruelty and pain."' 4
But as the twentieth century dawned, the Eighth Amendment's
place in constitutional jurisprudence would be revived. The Supreme
Court began to recognize that the Eighth Amendment was adopted
as a result of American perceptions that there was something inher-
ently wrong with inhumane punishment. As will be made evident in
the next Section, the Court, in its revival of the Eighth Amendment,
has consistently emphasized the Amendment's commitment to dig-
nity and decency, leaving the door open to extending the ban on
cruel and unusual punishment to the inhumane and mentally tortur-
ous shame sanctions.
C. The Twentieth Century Breathes New Life into the Eighth Amendment
Having laid largely dormant for the entire nineteenth century, the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause experi-
enced a rebirth in constitutional jurisprudence during the twentieth
century. The courts began to look at various sentencing structures
and punishments and evaluated their permissibility on constitutional
grounds. Finally, the Supreme Court began to adopt the view of the
Framers that the Eighth Amendment was in fact meant to bar inhu-
mane methods of punishment. Since the seminal decision in Weems
v. United States,85 "the Supreme Court has consistently held that the
concept of cruel and unusual punishment is constantly changing."m
In 1910, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Weems v.
United States, which would prove to be a watershed decision in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. The facts of the case are remarkable.
The defendant was sentenced in the Phillippines8 to fifteen years in
prison along with accessory penalties for false entries in a public
document. The Court did not sit idly on this grossly disproportion-
ate punishment for what amounted to little else than a clerical error
on the defendant's part.? Rather, in finding the punishment to be in
8 Id.
217 U.S. 349 (1910).
LARRYCHARLESBERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUELAND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 15 (1975).
The Phillippines were under U.S. constitutionajurisdiction. See Weems 217 U.S. at 357.
Id. at 357-58. Furthermore, those sentenced were forced into "hard and painful labor" for
the state. They were to be chained at the wrists and ankles at all times. Id. at 364.
89 Paul Weems was essentially convicted of a strict liability crime. The trial court had held
that "[wi]hether an offender against the statute injures any one by his act or intends to injure
any one is not material .... " Id. at 363.
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violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Court
took its first firm stand on the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.t °
In its decision, the Court announced that the Eighth Amendment
was to be a conduit for change in perceptions as to what is and is not
acceptable in society. Justice McKenna wrote in no uncertain terms:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from
an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be
necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Tune
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application
than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitu-
tions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing oc-
casions. They are... "designed to approach immortality as nearly as
human institutions can approach it." The future is their care and provi-
sion for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be
made. In the application of a constitution, therefore our contemplation
cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.
9?
Weems expresses the crucial principle that the Constitution is a living,
breathing document, designed to grow as society grows-its adapt-
ability is the very essence of its continued viability. The Weems court
recognized that the often narrow language of the Constitution was
not meant to be read as an absolute; instead, "[t]he meaning and
vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow and restric-
tive construction." 93
The Weems decision was crucial in allowing for a more liberal in-
terpretation of the Eighth Amendment to evolve. The Court explic-
itly made clear that the Eighth Amendment was designed to enforce
changes in social belief and not simply to reflect the predominant at-
90 "It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows impris-
onment. It is unusual in its character. Its punishments come under the condemnation of the
bill of rights, both on account of their degree and kind." Id. at 377.
91 Id. at 373. In coming to its decision, the Weems Court predominantly rested on what it
believed was the Framers' intent in adopting the Eighth Amendment. As defined by the Court,
the "intent of the adopters of the eighth amendment [was to grant] a constitutional mandate to
the judiciary to give 'efficacy and power' to the provision by deciding for itself what is cruel and
unusual." Pressly Millen, Note, Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment-Rummel, Solem, and the
Venerable Case ofWeems v. United States, 1984 DUKEL.J. 789, 802 (1984).
In analyzing the Framers' intentions in adopting the Eighth Amendment, the Court rec-
ognized that the Framers offered little by way of a definition of "cruel and unusual." However,
Justice McKenna in his majority opinion noted:
[The Framers'] predominant political impulse was distrust of power, and they insisted on
constitutional limitations against its abuse. But surely they intended more than to regis-
ter a fear of the forms of abuse that went out of practice with the Starts .... They were
men of action, practical and sagacious, not beset with vain imagining, and it must have
come to them that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those which in-
flicted bodily pain or mutilation.
Weens, 217 U.S. at 372.
93 Id. at 373.
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titude at the time of its adoption: "The [cruel and unusual punishment]
clause of the Constitution... may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened
to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlight-
ened by a humane justice." This is the linchpin of the Eighth Amend-
ment-it truly is a malleable constitutional provision that bends with
societal conceptions of humanity. Having revived the Eighth
Amendment as a vibrant part of the Constitution, "Weems would allow
courts freely to decide what is 'cruel and unusual,' as the eighth
amendment's adopters intended, without the scope of review being
bound by narrow historical constraints."9
The Court continued to lend weight to the Eighth Amendment in
Trop v. Dulles.96 It was in this case that the Supreme Court empha-
sized the Eighth Amendment's concern with decency: "The basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the
limits of civilized standards."97 Most importantly, the Court recog-
nized that the Eighth Amendment was in fact progressive and "that
'evolving standards of decency' is the litmus test for determining
whether a law violates the principles embodied in the Eighth
Amendment....""
The Trop ruling shed light on exactly what the Eighth Amend-
ment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment actually entailed.
Chief Justice Warren noted that the Amendment was to apply to
more than merely death penalty cases: "the existence of the death
penalty is not a license to the Government to devise any punishment
short of death within the limit of its imagination." The scope and
more importantly the cruelty of a method of punishment were in fact
judicially reviewable. No longer could the legislature or even a sitting
judge arbitrarily mete out punishments. In judging the constitution-
Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
Millen, supra note 91, at 789.
356 U.S. 86 (1957). Trop, a native-born American, had been stripped of his United States
citizenship by reason of his conviction by court-martial for wartime desertion. The Court ruled
that even if the government could legitimately divest an individual of citizenship under certain
circumstances, the statute at issue violated the Eighth Amendment because it was penal in na-
ture and prescribed a cruel and unusual punishment.
9 Id. at 100.
Roberta M. Harding, The Gallows to the Gurney: Analyzing the (Un)constitutionality of the
Methods of Execution, 6 B.U. PUB. INr. LJ. 153, 160 (1996) (arguing that Trop v. Dulles repre-
sented the "Court's vehicle for unambiguously promulgating the clause's modern interpreta-
tion"). See also Trap, 356 U.S. at 101 ("The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.").
Trop, 356 U.S. at 99. Furthermore, the Court went on to define 'unusual' in the context
of its use in the text of the Eighth Amendment: "If the word 'unusual' is to have any meaning
apart from the word 'cruel,' however, the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying some-
thing different from that which is generally done." Id. at 100-01 n.32.
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ality of a levied sanction, "[t] he question is whether this penalty sub-
jects the individual to a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized
treatment guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment. '' °
In Furman v. Georgia,'0' the Supreme Court espoused a workable
test in order to determine whether a punishment amounts to cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The test, outlined injustice Brennan's concurring opinion to the per
curiam opinion stated:
If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it
is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary soci-
ety, and if there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose
more effectively than some less severe punishment, then the continued
infliction of that punishment violates the command of the Clause that
the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon
those convicted of crimes.'t 2
Justice Brennan's test raises two main questions: First, "[i]s the pun-
ishment unacceptable to contemporary society or so degrading to
human dignity as to cause the offender mental anguish?.; and sec-
ond, " [i] s the punishment arbitrarily inflicted or excessive in relation
to the offense committed?"'04
The Supreme Court has transformed the Eighth Amendment into
secular gospel espousing humanity to all. Though the case law
largely focuses on the death penalty and the length of imprisonment,
there is little reason why the grounded conceptions of morality and
dignity that guided the thoughts of the Supreme Court Justices could
not be applied to the seemingly less severe punishments meted out
under the title of shame. After all, the Eighth Amendment was put in
place to protect human dignity.10 '5 In looking at the types of shame
and mentally distressing punishments, where the convicted are com-
I00 Id. at 99.
101 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). In Furman, three African-Americans were convicted of
rape and murder and sentenced to death. The court held that the imposition and carrying out
of the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, at least where a person convicted in a state court for murder or rape
was African-American and was sentenced to death after a trial by a jury that, under state law,
had discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty. The death penalty
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, because the application was discretionary,
haphazard, and discriminatory.
102 Id. at 282 (Brennan,J., concurring).
103 Kelley, supra note 48, at 773-74.
14 Id. at 774.
105 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 ("The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is noth-
ing less than the dignity of man."). See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding
that punishment is unconstitutional if it is "nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering"); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) ("The
clause of the Constitution... may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete
but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.").
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pelled to advertise their prior misdeeds, to undergo chemical castra-
ion, or to write mock obituaries for their children, it appears that
these punishments may go to the heart of what a modem society
would deem inhumane and undignifying. If these punishments do in
fact strip offenders of their dignity, then these innovative sanctions-
though possibly effectivelo--should be deemed unconstitutional un-
der the Eighth Amendment's protections against cruel and unusual
punishment.
III. INNOVATION GONE Too FAR
By analyzing shame and other innovative punishment schemes in
light ofJustice Brennan's concerns with dignity, mental anguish, and
arbitrariness0 7 this Section will demonstrate that these type of sanc-
tions run afoul of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.
A. Dignity
The reinvigoration of shame as part of the penal system is not
Without its proponents.1es From its retributive force to its educational
impact, shame certainly satisfies many of the goals of punishment.1m
However, despite its merits as an effective sanctioning system, the
human costs of a penal system that relies on shame remain too high.
Shame fails in that it so degrades human dignity that it is unaccept-
able in contemporary society and does in fact cause mental anguish
to those who must bear the burden of fulfilling the draconian pun-
ishments.1
The first and probably most important attack on shame sanctions
are that they do in fact impose an extremely undignifying penalty on
the offender. For all its espoused virtue, shame "menaces certain
ideals that any morally respectable mode of punishment should
honor, not the least of which is human dignity."'"1 Given such an at-
tack on the dignity of man, such penalties may fail to survive any scru-
106 SeeKahan, supra note 11, at 630-53 (defending the use of shame punishments).
107 See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
108 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 11 (establishing and justifying the shaming model of punish-
ment).
109 See generally id. at 638-41 (describing shame as the optimal means of deterrence); Massaro,
supra note 21, at 1890-1900 (arguing that shame sanctions are justifiable on all standard theo-
ries of punishment-retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation-but still not
supporting shame as a viable mode of state sanction); James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with
InJlicting Shame Sanctions? 107 YALE LJ. 1055, 1062 (1998) ("[S~hame sanctions.., seem beauti-
fully retributive.").
110 Garvey, supra note 4, at 757-61 (examining arguments that shame is undignified).
II Id. at 739.
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tiny. In his 1998 article Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, Stephen
Garvey summarizes the arguments of those opposed to shaming pun-
ishments:
According to Toni M. Massaro, a powerful critic of shaming penalties,
"[s]tate-enforced shaming authorizes public officials to search for and
destroy or damage an offender's dignity." According to Andrew Von
Hirsch, the stocks and pillory... may be the classic examples of illegiti-
mate demeaning rituals, forcing offenders to "attach self-accusing
bumper-stickers to their vehicles" and other forms of "compulsory attitu-
dinalizing" should also be ruled out on grounds of dignity.1
Contemporary shaming penalties often cross the line from effec-
tive punishment to the infliction of little else than public embarrass-
ment of the offender. For example, Garvey cites a town in Arkansas
that, in hopes of curbing juvenile delinquency, imposed a city ordi-
nance requiring parents of delinquents be "placed within stockaded
public display six hours a day."113 An even more extreme example is
the case in which an offender was forced to wear a diaper over his
clothing because he was "acting like a baby."
114
Many proponents of shame respond to the indignity arguments
made by the detractors by pointing to two persuasive realities: First,
they argue that prison itself is an indignity and that the indignity of
shame is simply a substitute for that of prison; and second, because
shaming penalties are usually a condition of probation, there is an
element of consent involved. 
5
With respect to the first argument, Stephen Garvey has argued
that the social meaning of prison is ambiguous and thus
"[c] omparing the indignity of prison with that of shaming penalties is
complicated."1 16 However, if prison means the deprivation of liberty,
then it is not beyond comprehension that a "person can endure the
deprivation of... liberties with dignity."17 If this is the case, then it is
possible to conclude that a short imprisonment 18 may be better than
shame, because it does in fact preserve the offender's dignity.
The other defense of shame is that those upon whom the penal-
ties are imposed often consent to the punishment as a condition of
probation, in order to avoid imprisonment. Often from the of-
fender's perspective, shame is a better choice than confinement. 9
However, as has been well established, consent is only valid if it is not
112 Id. at 758.
113 1&t at 759.
114 Id.
15 Id. at 761.
116 Id.
117 Id. (citing ANDREWVON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCrONS 82 (1993)).
18 Most shame sanctions are in lieu of a fine or short stay in prison.
19 Garvey, supra note 4, at 761-62.
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coerced.1'2 Stephen Garvey has argued that "in order to know
whether or not consent is coerced, we need to know the relevant
baseline. That is, what's the alternative to the 'chosen' option?"
121
Those who choose shame generally do so to avoid prison, but why is
prison the baseline? Thus, "[i]n order for consent to constitute a full
defense of shame, what's needed is an argument that imprisonment
is the morally appropriate default option."
It is clear then that shame robs an offender of his dignity. How-
ever voluntary or perhaps more desirable a choice than confinement,
shame has no place in a contemporary society that proclaims the ut-
most respect for the individual.' The effectiveness of shame rests in
the importance of personal dignity to each violator. However, that is
exactly what the Eighth Amendment specifically alms to protect.
Thus, because personal dignity and humanity are highly valued in
our society, T2 then punishments that violate these values would have
to be deemed problematic and in contrast to the idealism embodied
in the ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
B. MentalAnguish
Shaming penalties are taxing not only on a person's dignity, but
also on his mental health. Unlike imprisonment, where whatever
undignifying experiences that may exist take place behind guarded
concrete fortresses, shaming penalties place the offender in the pub-
lic eye. A person is left to suffer great humiliation before the public
at large.12 Though this is one of the goals of shame it does not neces-
sarily make it appropriate. As Brennan noted, one of the characteris-
12 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (holding that a consent that
is in any way coerced is not a valid consent); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548
(1968) ("When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent tojustify the lawfulness of a search, he
has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given."); United
States v. Pena, 143 F.3d 1363, 1366 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Valid consent is that which is freely and
voluntarily given.").
121 Garvey, supra note 4, at 761.
12 Id. at 762. Defenders of shaming sanctions have yet to make the argument that impris-
onment is the appropriate baseline. A lesser sanction may in fact be the more appropriate base-
line. For example, "if the punishment for an offender who 'consents' to shame should be
straight probation and not imprisonment then what looks like an offer is in fact a threat, and
the offender's consent to shame is coerced and thus invalid." Id.
12 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) ("The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.").
124 See generally MARGALIT, supra note 17, at 262; JOHN RAWS, A THEOY OFJUSICE 440-46
(1971) (discussing the importance of preserving self-respect and eliminating shame in liberal
society).
1 See, e.g., GABR=ELE TAYLOR, PRIDE, SHAME, AND GUILT: EMOTIONS OF SELF-ASSESSMENF 53
(1985) ("[S]hame ... introduces... the notion of an audience, for feeling shame is connected
with the thought that eyes are upon one.").
JOURNAL OF CONS Ti TiIONAL LAW
tics that makes a punishment reprehensible in the eyes of the Consti-
tution is that it causes the offender extreme mental anguish.'26
Shame works largely because it is such a powerful emotion. By af-
fecting a person's entire conception of self, shame often works too
well.'2 There have even been instances in which offenders subjected
to shaming punishments ultimately committed suicide.128 However,
the less extreme responses to shame are just as intolerable. Because
"[t]he anxiety that shaming exploits is a fear of abandonment or iso-
lation, usually from a social group or other community that is neces-
sary or valuable to the individual," many victims of shame penalties
feel it necessary to hide or even exit the community29 Rather than
simply providing the offender with intense feelings of shame, the
sanction may cause the offender to become "socially alienated and
disaffected."
Thus, the crippling effects of shame may last well beyond the im-
position and completion of the penalty. A person who has commit-
ted a relatively minor crime may feel the lasting effects not of his
crime, but of his punishment for years to come. Therefore, "the
stigma of shaming may be irreversible."'32 Shaming penalties place
the offender in a position where he may suffer extreme emotional
anguish, and that anguish may be disproportionate to the crime
12 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (placing the
imposition of mental anguish as potentially constitutionally impermissible under the Eighth
Amendment). See also Kelley, supra note 48, at 773-74 (characterizing the Furman test as asking
whether the punishment is "so degrading to human dignity as to cause the offender mental an-
guish").
127 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 125, at 89 ("[Fleelings of guilt are localized in a way in which
feelings of shame are not localized; they concern themselves with the wrong done, not with the
kind of person one thinks one is.").
2 See, e.g., Courtney Guyton Persons, Note, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency,
Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes' Patrons, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 1525, 1527 (1996) ( "In 1994, a paper in New Jersey listed a young engineer among other
prostitution arrestees. The recent widower and father of three killed himself when he saw his
name in the paper."). This is not to say that shame sanctions are the only form of punishment
that may lead to suicide. But it is a potential result that perhaps should be considered in the
debate.
129 Massaro, supra note 21, at 1902.
1s0 Garvey, supra note 4, at 748.
131 Of course much of the social impact and effectiveness of shame depends on the size of
the community. For example, a person subject to shaming sanctions in a major city may per-
form his punishment in anonymity, while someone in a small community where all residents
are connected would feel intense feelings of public humiliation as he carries out his punish-
ment in front of an entire community of people with whom he has ready and recurrent contact.
See Garvey, supra note 4, at 753 ("All else being equal ... shaming penalties are likely to be
more effective in Kenosha than they are in Manhattan.").
13 Massaro, supra note 21, at 1937.
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committed,s thus rendering the punishment cruel and unusual.
C. Arbitrariness
The revival of shame sanctions has not been, for the most part, a
product of any concerted judicial effort; rather, shame sanctions
seem to be more the result of "whimsical bursts ofjudicial, legislative,
or prosecutorial inspiration."134 In general, shame sanctions seem to
be custom designed to the offender; thus, the penalties are likely to
be applied unequally. Judges, who have discretion to impose creative
sentences, may be inclined to deliver shame sanctions to some, while
simply fining others&" According to the Furman test,M the unequal
application of a sanction leaves it open to a determination that the
sanction itself is a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The risk of unequal application could be managed by mandatory
sentencing guidelines. However, as Toni Massaro has argued, no
realistic sentencing guidelines could accurately cover all the factors
that may determine the effect of a sanction"ss With respect to shame,
this problem is especially profound, because shame is "elusive and in-
tensely offender-specific." More importantly, if judges do take the
individualized meaning of shame into account, the end result could
be that "prominent, white collar or upper-class offenders, who have
more social status to lose, would receive milder sentences than less
prominent lower-class offenders."'14 And yet ignoring the individual
nature of shame may lead to judges handing out overly punitive sen-
tences to some offenders.41
At this time, modem shaming sanctions violate notions and prin-
ciples of even-handed punishments. Judges who mete out shame
sanctions often do so for one offender and not for other similarly
133 "Once an offense becomes notorious, the public will do as it chooses with the informa-
tion, regardless of official admonitions. This would be especially true in work and social rela-
tionships, where shunning might be acute for some offenders." Massaro, supra note 21, at 1938.
LA I& at 1940.
135 See EDWIN POWERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMINr IN EARLYMASSACHUSETIS 195-96 (1966) (not-
ing that it was the poorer and less reputable class of citizens who were sentenced to the stocks,
while respected citizens were likely to be fined).
13 Seesupra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
137 Massaro, supra note 21, at 1940 ("The risk of unequal application of shame sanctions
might be controlled by requiring that all legislatures adopt mandatory sentencing guidelines,
aplied evenly to all offenders.").
Id. at 1941. Factors that exist may include how many times an offender has committed a
crime, and why the crime was committed.
1S9 Id
140 Id.
141 I&
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situated offenders.'4 By doing so, the judge is arbitrarily picking an
actor and subjecting him to punishments that others are not at risk of
receiving. In order to satisfy conceptions of equality, all like offend-
ers must face the same modes of condemnation, and with shame this
becomes impossible to achieve.
Shame sanctions fail Brennan's test at every level.'4 They rob the
offender of his dignity, which is something that no liberal democracy
can accept. 44 The imposition of shame is also likely to cause extreme
mental anguish, the effects of which last well beyond the completion
of the sentence. Finally, because the effects of shame are offender-
specific, the result is that such sanctions are applied unequally, and
can never truly attain any sense of uniform applicability. The result is
that, in light of the Furman test, shame sanctions should be construed
as unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
At its core, shame is an undignifying experience. Its imposition is
in many instances mentally torturous, and even worse, is incompati-
ble with just conceptions that like offenders be subject to like sen-
tences. It is an innovation in punishment that many hail as a great
step forward in penology.145 However, as Toni Massaro has noted,
"[T] he elusiveness of shame, the unreflective way in which the new
shaming sanctions have been developed, and the serious harm to
human dignity that truly effective shaming can cause, all suggest that
the fairness objections to official shunning and shame are particularly
compelling."' Shame is nothing more than a revival of the very
modes of punishment that came to be considered barbaric and intol-
erable during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
As the Constitution has evolved and the meaning of "cruel and
unusual punishment" has come to embrace the ideal of liberal pro-
gressiveness, shame has slipped from a pedestal of innovative pun-
1 Id. at 1942 (discussing a case where a judge singled out one sex offender from many to
receive a shaming punishment, because the judge "simply wanted to set an example").
1 Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282
(1972), stated:
If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbi-
trarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to
believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less severe punish-
ment, then the continued infliction of that punishment violates the command of the
Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those
convicted of crimes.
14 See MARGAUIT, supra note 17, at 262.
145 See Kahan, supra note 11, at 630-52 (extolling the virtue of shame as an alternative sanc-
tion of wrongdoers).
146 Massaro, supra note 21, at 1937.
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ishment to an abyss of unconstitutionality. Shame has no place in a
society constructed to respect individual dignity, and thus has no
place under the constitutional regime established by the Eighth
Amendment.
